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KENTUCKY LAw JoTRNAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF A MASTER FOR ASSAULTS MADE
BY HIS COLLECTORS
The doctrine of respondeat superior is a concept which provides
the grist for many a discussion or argument in legal circles. It per-
vades the whole field of agency in some degree or another, and just
how it applies to the various principal-agent or master-servant situa-
tions presents a problem which each court must resolve to its own satis-
faction, harmonizing the application of the doctrine to the particular
situation with its own previous decisions. Recently in the case of
Citizens Finance Company v. Walton1 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
applied the doctrine to a situation involving the collection of money.
The finance company had sent its servant to collect from the mother
of one of its debtors. The mother had agreed to collect money due
her son and hold it for the company. She told the collector she could
-not pay him at that time since she had not collected all of the money
due her son. Words were exchanged and a scuffle ensued in which
the mother's index finger was injured. She sued the company for the
assault seeking to hold it responsible under respondeat superior. The
court held that the mere act of sending out a collector should not
make the employer liable for an assault made by the servant since the
use of force is not a part of or an incident to the act of collecting
money. It indicated that something more must be shown that would
actually link the master with the assault, i.e., that the master ratified
the act of the servant, or that he authorized or gave instructions for
the use of force, or that the master was negligent in sending out a
servant whom it knew would employ force in making the collection or
who was in the habit of using force.2
By this decision the Kentucky court aligns itself with the modem,
and seemingly more reasonable, view of the responsibility of a master
in the collection situation. From the cases it appears that the attitude
of any particular court toward this situation is often a reflection of
that court's general attitude toward the over-all problem of respondeat
superior. The divergency in attitude arises because of a difference of
opinion as to the proper place to locate the outer perimeter of the
scope of employment. It is the attitude of some courts that since the
'239 S.W. 2d 77 (Ky. 1951).
'The court cited no collection cases, but cited the rule in Moore v. Ford
Motor Company, 265 Ky. 575, 97 S.W. 2d 400 (1936), as applicable. In that case
the defendant's foreman assaulted plaintiff in trying to get his signature on a
service record. In holding the Ford Company not liable, the court ruled that
an assault was not an incident to the at of procuring signatures on the company's
records.
Noms AND Co rMNTs
employer selects and sends out his servant to deal with the public, he
should be responsible for acts, wilfull or negligent, done in the further-
ance of his business.3
An example of a strict liability attitude is shown in the Connecticut
case of Son v. Hartford Ice Cream Company.4 In this case the de-
fendant's servant was to deliver ice cream and collect for it. The
servant made a delivery to the plaintiff who refused to accept it for
the reason that it was not sufficiently frozen. The driver insisted upon
leaving it and demanded payment. Plaintiff refused to pay, and the
driver went to plaintiff's cash register and tried to take the money out
of it. Plaintiff managed to get it closed, whereupon the driver picked
up the register and tried to carry it off. In the resulting scuffle the
plaintiff was hurt, and he sued the master. In holding the master
liable for the servants acts this court said:
"When the servant is doing or attempting to do the very thing
which he was directed to do, the master is liable through the servant's
method of doing it be wholly unauthorized or forbidden."'
This case is indicative of how far a court can go in applying strict
liability., Is this a reasonable result? Was the servant in this case
truly attempting to do the "very thing which he was directed to do?"
Can it be seriously contended that carrying off a debtor's cash drawer
is a usual or customary method of collection? This would seem to be
an act of force which is such a deviation from the normal practice of
bill collecting as to take it completely out of the scope of bill collecting.
This was an act which an ordinary employer would never authorize,
or even contemplate. It was the personal and wilfull act of the driver
a It appears that most, if not all, courts will hold the master not liable for
purely personal acts of his servants, such as: sexual assaults, Rohrmoser v. House-
hold Finance Corp., 231 Mo. App. 1188, 86 S.W. 2d 103 (1935); Anderson v.
Metropolitan Ins. Co., 220 App. Div. 779, 218 N.Y.S. (1926); personal quarrels,
Moffitt v. White Sewing Machine Co., 214 Mich. 496, 183 N.W. 198 (1921);
Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 82 N.W. 304 (1900); or where servant is
pecuniarily responsible for non-collectio, McDermott v. American Brewing Co.,
105 La. 124, 29 So. 498 (1901); Steinman v. Baltimore Antiseptic Steam Laundry
Co., 109 Md. 62, 71 AUt. 517 (1908); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Guffey, 59 S.W.
2d 174 (Tex. 1933).
'102 Conn. 696, 129 AUt. 778 (1925).5 Id. at 129 At. at 780. For cases indicating a similar attitude see: Case v.
Hulsebush, 122 Ala. 212, 26 So. 155 (1899); Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga.
App. 778, 171 S.E. 470 (1933); Moffit v. White Sewing Machine Co., 214 Mich.
496; 183 N.W. 198 (1921); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Guffy, 59 S.W. 2d 174
(Tex. 1933).
1 In Hiroshima v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 18 Cal. App. 2d 24, 63 P. 2d
340 (1936), the court indicated that even if the act of the servant were not
within the scope of employment, his master still might be liable if the act was
intimately connected with other acts within the scope. The court relied on Gulf,
C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cobb, (Tex. Civ. App.) 45 S.W. 2d 323 (1931) for this rule.
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which, though directed in attaining his master's ends, was in fact
foreign to those ends. It is submitted that this rule imposes a heavy
burden on the employer, and that a literal application of this rule
would undoubtedly lead to harsh results in many situations.
Other courts in order to avoid such consequences have developed
a different rule which has been approved by the American Law In-
stitute in its Restatement of Agency, and by many text writers.7 These
courts recognize the fact that the use of force is not a normal part of
the employment of bill collecting. As the Missouri court said in Col-
lette v. Rebori:8
"To assault and beat a creditor [sic] is not a recognized or usual
means resorted to for the collection of a debt, nor is it one likely to
bring about the settlement of a disputed account."9
These courts are of the opinion that a master may be liable for a
servants wilfull act, such as an assault, when done in the furtherance
of the master's business, but only when such business would indicate
that force might be resorted to in its accomplishment.10 They feel a
master should not be liable for all acts of a servant done ostensibly
in the furtherance of his business. They recognize that in attempting
to serve his master's ends an individual servant may proceed in various
ways so far removed from the customary and usual procedures of
business conduct that the master would not foresee such activity when
selecting and sending out the servant for the job. These courts hold as
a matter of law that the task of bill collecting does not, actually or im-
pliedly, call for the use of force. They believe that when a collector
does assault a debtor, the master should not be liable under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior unless something more than mere employ-
ment is shown."- It is necessary to show complicity or negligence on
the master's part before he can be subjected to liability.' 2
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, see. 245, comment a, p. 390 (1933); MEcrmm, THE
LAw oF AGENCY, sec. 1978, p. 1540 (2d ed. 1914); 2 CooLEy, TonRs, p. 1037 (3d
ed. 1906).
8107 Mo. App. 711, 82 S.W. 552, 555 (1904).
'Id. at -, S.W. at 555.
"0Reece v. Ebersbach, 152 Fla. 763, 9 So. 2d 805 (1940), cert. denied 318
U. S. 784 (1942), rehearing denied 319 U.S. 781 (1942); Moskins Stores Inc. v.
DeHart, 217 Ind. 622, 29 N.E. 2d 948 (1940); Barney v. Jewel Tea Co., 104 Utah
292, 139 P. 2d 878 (1943).
' See cases cited note 9 supra; Zucker v. Lannin Realty Co., 217 App. Div.
487, 217 N.Y.S. 65 (1926); Matsuda v. Hammond, 77 Wash. 120, 137 P. 328
(1913).
"" In order to hold the master for an assault and battery by a collector, it is
necessary to show that the use of force was contemplated or usual in the conduct
of the master's business of collecting accounts, or that the master knew, or had
reasonable cause to know, that the servant was the type of person who was likely
to resort to force in the course of his efforts to collect the accounts." Moskins
Stores Inc. v. DeHart, 217 Ind. 622, 29 N.E. 2d 948, 949-950 (1940).
NOTES AND CoMrMNs
Normal bill collecting calls for tact, patience, and diplomacy, and
resort to fisticuffs should never be made. Nobody loves a bill collector,
and finance companies and installment sellers do not wish to encour-
age further public antipathy by advocating strong-arm methods of
collection. Business customs indicate that negotiation is in order, not
physical violence. It would seem that the view adopted by the Ken-
tucky court meets the situation squarely and reaches the proper result.
A bill collector is not sent out with any type of dangerous instru-
mentality to agument his efforts, as in armed guard cases.'8 There is
no tangible object over which the collector and debtor can engage in a
struggle, as in repossession cases. 14 Usually resort is made to collection
in order to prevent the necessity of an action in debt accompanied by
attachment or garnishment proceedings. If the collector is unsuccess-
ful in his attempt, his employer still has these peaceful means at his
command to bring about settlement of the account. The collector is
sent out merely to avoid reliance upon these less desirable means of
collection. As one court intimated, 5 if a bill collector makes an assault
upon one of his master's debtors, the assault will not usually attain the
desired effect; it will enrage the debtor so that he will become more
recalcitrant than before, and in addition will very likely sue the
master for the assault. In many cases the altercation between a debtor
and a bill collector has its origin in personal animosity between the
two individuals, though it was the master's business which set the
stage and brought them together. In such cases where it is of such a
personal nature between the two actors the master properly should
not be held responsible for it. If the debtor becomes abusive, the col-
lector can best serve his master by adopting a conciliatory attitude
and by retreating if necessary. If the collector replies in kind he is
likely giving vent to his own personal sense of indignation and in-
justice. The master should not be held liable for such conduct.
Liability with out fault, though justifiable in many cases, is at best
a harsh rule, and should be imposed with great care and circum-
spection.16 It should not be imposed in the collection situation where
' Where the employer furnishes, or requires the agent to carry, a gun, the
employer will be held responsible for a shooting done in the course of employment.
See Amer. Ry. Exp. Co. v. Tait, 211 Ala. 348, 100 So. 328 (1924); Wiley v. Pere
Marquette Ry. Co., 235 Mich. 279, 209 N.W. 59 (1926). And see Craig's Admx.
v. Ky. Utilities Co., 183 Ky. 274, 209 S.W. 33 (1919).
" C.I.T. Corp. v. Brewer, 146 Fla. 247, 200 So. 910 (1941) (repossession of
automobile); Rich v. Dugan, 135 Neb. 63, 280 N.W. 225 (1938) (repossession of
tractor).
," Supra note 8.
" See MEcsssm, OurTrnm¢ oF =ru LAw AGENcy, sees. 499-501, pp. 325-328
(3d ed. 1923).
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the use of force is not to be comtemplated, 7 where no dangerous in-
strumentality is used, and where the master is under no duty to protect
the debtor from harm.'8 The Connecticut rule seems too strict in im-
posing liability, for it makes the master liable in many case where he
properly should not be. On the other hand, the Kentucky rule will not
leave the debtor at the tender mercies of unscrupulous creditors, yet it
will protect the master from the personal wilfull acts of his servants in
situations which are often provoked by the debtor-plaintiff himself.
CHALs N. CAnNES
PUBLIC INTEREST AS A LIMITATION OF THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY
"Redress for the invasion of the right of privacy has been recog-
nized so generally in recent years that it no longer may be questioned."'
Based on the idea that each individual has a right to lead his life un-
hampered by the prying fingers of publicity, this doctrine has gained
more and more importance in the field of tort law, protecting those
whose histories, names and likenesses have been needlessly held be-
fore the public eye.
When the right of privacy was first championed in 1890 by Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, the authors proposed limitations
upon the right, the first of which was that "the right to privacy does
not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general
interest."2 This limitation is generally recognized today in jurisdic-
tions which acknowledge the right of privacy.3 Therefore, one of the
" As in the cases of guards (see cases cited supra note 12), or where agent is
put in charge of premises and is expected to maintain order or protect them. J. J.
Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309, 82 S.W. 2d 359 (1935) (Store manager);
Dennert v. Dee, 308 Ky. 687, 215 S.W. 2d 575 (1948) (bar-tender); Moore v.
Blanchard, (La. App.) 35 So. 2d 667 (1948) (bouncer.)
As in the case of a carrier, which is under a duty to protect passengers from
assaults by its servants, strangers, or fellow passengers. Gladdish v. South Eastern
Greyhound Lines, 293 Ky. 498, 169 S.W. 2d 297 (1943); Hull v. Boston & M.
R. R., 210 Mass. 159, 96 N.E. 58 (1911).
'Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W. 2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1951).
'Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAmv. L. RPv., 193, 214 (1890).
"If any (right of privacy) exists, it does not protect one from having his
name or likeness appear in a newspaper when there is a legitimate public interest
in his existence, his experiences, his words, or his acts." Themo v. New England
Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E. 2d 753, 755 (1940). See also
Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 Fed. Supp. 305 (D. C. 1948); Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp.
113 F. 2d 806 (C.C.A. 2d 1940); Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P. 2d
320 (1949); Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. 2d 133 (1945);
Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror Inc., 295 N.Y.S. 382 (Sup. Ct. Special Term 1937);
Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
